computazionalismo secondo Fodor
main argument of this book runs as follows:
1. The only psychological models of cognitive processes that seem even
remotely plausible represent such processes as computational.
2. Computation presupposes a medium of computation: a representational
3. Remotely plausible theories are better than no theories at all.
4. We are thus provisionally committed to attributing a representation
system to organisms. 'Provisionally committed' means: committed insofar
as we attribute cognitive processes to organisms and insofar as we take
seriously such theories of these processes as are currently available.
5. It is a reasonable research goal to try to characterize the
representational system to which we thus find ourselves provisionally
6. It is a reasonable research strategy to try to infer this
characterization from the details of such psychological theories as seem
likely to prove true.
7. This strategy may actually work: It is possible to exhibit specimen
inferences along the lines of item 6 which, if not precisely apodictic,
have at least an air of prima facie plausibility"